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ere is widespread controversy about the use of intuitions in philosophy. In this
paper I will argue that there are legitimate concerns about this use, and that these
concerns cannot be fully responded to using the traditional methods of philosophy.
We need an understanding of how intuitions are generated and what it is they are
based on, and this understanding must be founded on the psychological investiga-
tion of the mind. I explore how a psychological understanding of intuitions is likely
to impact a range of philosophical projects, from conceptual analysis to the study
of (non-conceptual) “things themselves” to experimental philosophy.
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Philosophers use intuitions when doing philosophy. Not exclusively, not al-
ways, and perhaps not all philosophers, but most of us and quite oen. In-
tuitions in many cases play the role that observation does in science—they
are the data that must be explained, the conrmers or the falsiers of the-
ories. However, unlike observation in science, there is widespread contro-
versy about the role intuitions play in philosophy. Robert Cummins (1998),
for example, argues that they are “epistemologically useless” in part because
of concerns about their accuracy (Cummins 1998, 125), andHilary Kornblith
argues that “philosophy cannot live up to its ambitions” if it continues to em-
phasize the use of intuitions, since, on his view, they merely tell us about our
concepts (Kornblith 2006, 11). More traditionallyminded philosophers have
defended the use of intuitions against these sorts of criticisms. George Bealer
and Lawrence BonJour have argued, for example, that intuitions are essen-
tial to the practice of philosophy and attempted to defend their accuracy
and usefulness on a priori grounds (Bealer 1998, BonJour 1998). So-called
experimental philosophers have come down on both sides of this debate. Fa-
mously, Jonathan Weinberg, Shaun Nichols, and Steven Stich have claimed
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158 Psychology and the Use of Intuitions in Philosophy
on the basis of experimental results that intuitions about knowledge vary
from culture to culture, and thus should not be used as the basis for norma-
tive conclusions (Weinberg et al. 2001). Others have claimed that careful use
of experimental methods can potentially help us respond to some criticisms
of intuitions.1
In this paper I will advocate a new approach to this debate. Concerns
about the use of intuitions are legitimate and justied, and I argue that they
cannot be dismissed using only the a priori methods of traditional philos-
ophy. However, abandoning intuitions on the basis of these concerns is too
hasty. Instead, we should improve our understanding of what intuitions are
and how they are generated in order to assess what role they can and should
play in philosophy. I will argue that intuitions are the results of unconscious
processes that can only be understood through psychological investigation
of themind. It turns out that these processes are capable of generating useful
and accurate evidence about a number of issues in philosophy, although not
necessarily all of them.ey are able to tell us not only about our concepts
but also in some cases about things themselves—extra-conceptual facts—
but proper use of intuitions both in conceptual analysis and as evidence
about extra-conceptual facts should be guided by an understanding of psy-
chology. Finally, I will look at how this might impact some of the various
projects of experimental philosophy.
1. Worries about Intuitions
Whatever position one occupies in the debate about intuitions, it is hard to
deny that worries about their use in philosophy are legitimate. Intuitions
are called upon to do a lot of work for us: we advance philosophical theo-
ries on the basis of their agreement with our intuitions, and plausible and
useful theories have been discredited because of conicts with intuitions. At
the same time, we generally give no reasons why one should accept the spe-
cic intuitions we use as evidence, there are no widely agreed upon views
of the sources of intuitions, and despite the fact that intuitions are a mental
phenomenon, philosophers generally have little understanding of the men-
tal processes that aect them. What is more, we know for a fact that in-
tuitions are not a wholly reliable source of evidence; not only can dierent
people have dierent intuitions about the same case, the intuitions of a sin-
gle individual can sometimes conict.ere seem to be few clear marks that
dierentiate trustworthy types of intuitions from untrustworthy, nor do we
have any good data on the frequency with which our intuitions are wrong.
When so much weight is placed upon a source of alleged evidence that we
1 (Weinberg et al. 2006).
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do not understand, and the reliability of which can easily be questioned but
not easily checked, it makes sense to be concerned.
One might, however, accept that reasons for concern exist without ac-
cepting that these concerns must be responded to. Ernest Sosa (1998) has
argued along these lines. He claims that worries about intuitions are similar
to those we have about perception; since our use of perceptual evidence is
justied despite these worries, our use of intuitions is as well. We certainly
know that sometimes our senses mislead us (when observing small objects,
or those far away, for example), and we know that our senses might entirely
mislead us (if there were an evil demon). In addition, people did not un-
derstand how sense perception worked for most of human history. Even so,
our use of our perceptual faculties was and remains justied. Why, then,
demand that we understand how our intuitions work or be able to assuage
worries about their reliability in order to use them as evidence?
Worries about intuitions aremore pressing than those about perception.
Let us bracket evil demon style skepticism; few of us take the possibility of
evil demons as reason to stop using our senses, and worries about intuitions
are not of this sort.ese worries to the side, we have a good understanding
of when sense perception actually goes astray.at is, we can give a system-
atic account of the conditions in which we are likely to get bad data from
our senses (e.g. when we are asleep, or very tired, or have ingested certain
chemicals).is prevents facts about failures of our senses from giving rise
to general doubts about the use of perception, since our evidence about per-
ceptual error is that (as far as we know) it is limited to an identiable set
of circumstances. We are not in an analogous position with regard to in-
tuitions in philosophy.ere are some identiable classes of intuitions that
we know are especially error prone—intuitions about innite sets are a good
example. But we can point to examples of erroneous intuitions throughout
philosophy, and these errors do not seem to be limited to specic philosoph-
ical domains or topics, nor (as far as we currently know) do they only occur
in identiable circumstances. I know of no attempt to systematize all or the
majority of errors in philosophical intuitions, and the lack of a systematic
account of intuitive errors puts us in a dierent, and worse, epistemic posi-
tion with respect to intuitions than we are in with respect to perception.e
proper response to concerns about intuitions is not to try to argue for the
status quo—the continued use of intuitions with no understanding of their
sources or reliability—but instead should involve determining whether and
to what extent intuitions can accurately tell us facts of philosophical interest.
e best way of doing this is to develop a general and systematic under-
standing of how intuitions work: where they come from, how they are gen-
erated, what they are and are not based on, what factors aect them. Such
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an understanding is worth pursuing for a number of reasons. It, combined
with an understanding of what kind of evidence we need for our various
philosophical projects, could alleviate uncertainty about the usefulness of
intuitions, allow us to rene our methods of gathering them, and help us to
only use them when they are reliably accurate. Such an understanding may
also be helpful in resolving conicts between intuitions, since some of the
conicting intuitions may turn out to be of an unreliable sort. ere are,
of course, other ways of learning about the reliability of intuitions, among
them checking intuitions against known facts, but there are limits on their
applicability that would not aect a general understanding of the sources of
intuitions. For example, checking intuitions against known facts to test their
reliability will only work to the extent to which we know the answers our in-
tuitions should give, and would not be very useful in philosophical domains
about which relatively little is currently known for certain. A general under-
standing of how intuitions work could be useful in checking the reliability of
our intuitions in such domains, however. Even with only a little knowledge
about some philosophical topic, we might be able to set standards (at least
minimal ones) that something would have to meet to qualify as a source of
data about it. Given a general understanding of how intuitions work, we
could then determine if they at least meet those standards.
George Bealer and Lawrence BonJour, among others, have accounts of
intuitions that aim at giving us a general understanding of how they work.
eir accounts are attempts to build theories of intuitions a priori. I argue
that a correct understanding of how intuitions work can only be gained em-
pirically and only by doing psychology, not philosophy. As we will see in the
next section, this follows in part from the nature of intuitions.
2. Intuitions and Psychology
In order to see that psychology is necessary to understand how intuitions
work, we rst need to know what intuitions are. In colloquial use, ‘intuition’
refers to a faculty and also to the deliverances of that faculty: we can say
‘My intuition tells me P’, and also ‘I have the intuition that P’. I will use the
term only in the second way, in part because that is how the term is used
in contemporary philosophy, and also so as not to assume that there is a
single faculty of intuition. Intuitions in this sense are had by people; let us
call a person who has a given intuition an intuitor. When an intuitor has
an intuition, that intuition has some propositional content, and because of
this we can say that the intuition is about something (the things that the
content represents). So, if Fred has the intuition that murder is wrong, Fred
is the intuitor, the content of the intuition is that murder is wrong, and the
intuition is about murder and wrongness.
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But what is the intuition?2 An intuition is not its content, just as be-
liefs and desires are not identical to their contents. An intuition is a kind of
experience.3 George Bealer’s term for it, which I think apt, is ‘seeming’—an
intuition is some content seeming to be true (Bealer 1998). However, not ev-
ery seeming is an intuition. Intuitions are typically distinguished from what
are sometimes called “perceptual seemings”, such as the seeming that there
is a computer in front of me that is due to my seeing a computer in front of
me; from seemings due to recollection, such as the seeming that I have been
to Disneyland that is due to my recalling that I have been to Disneyland;
and from seemings that are due to beliefs becoming occurrent, such as the
seeming that intuitions are seemings that is due to my becoming once again
conscious of my belief that this is true.
I want to distinguish intuitions from one other type of seeming, as this
distinction is essential to understanding what intuitions are. Sometimes
something seems true to one just because one has consciously employed
some sort of reasoning and concluded that it is true. For example, imagine
I hear an argument, consider each of its premises and come to understand
that they are true, and employ truth tables and come to see that the argu-
ment is valid. Based only on this, the conclusion of the argument seems true
to me.is seeming is not an intuition.is is true in part because this just
is not how we use the term ‘intuition’. What we call intuitions are things that
just strike us as true without us knowing entirely why they do. Even more
compellingly, if intuitions were seemings due entirely to conscious reason-
ing, they would not play the role in philosophy that they do. Intuitions are
oen used as if they were evidence, so the principle of charity tells us that we
should take them to be the sort of thing that could possibly be evidence. If a
proposition seems true because we have reasoned about it (and only because
of this), the fact that it seems true does not give us any evidence that it is true
beyond the evidence upon which we based our reasoning. If we counted the
feeling as evidence in addition to the evidence we reasoned from, we would
be double counting our evidence (since the feeling comes solely from the
evidence used in the reasoning). To make the same point another way, for
any proposition that seems true solely on the basis of conscious reasoning,
we would have just as much evidence for its truth even if we had reasoned in
exactly the same way to the conclusion and it did not feel true.us, if some
2 Here I am trying to draw upon the consensus about intuitions in philosophy; although
I disagree with many philosopher’s views of how intuitions come about and their exact
evidentiary status, I do want to be talking about the same thing as they are. See (Sosa
1998), (Bealer 1998), (Pust 2000), (BonJour 1998), (Cohen 1986), for more detail on the
claims in this paragraph.
3 See (Pust 2000) for a discussion of why accounts that allow intuitions to be dispositions,
or non-occurrent in some way (thus not necessarily experiences) fail.
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proposition seems to be true and that seeming arises solely from conscious
reasoning, the seeming is not evidence for its truth. Since intuitions are sup-
posed to be evidence (at least some of the time), they cannot be based en-
tirely on conscious reasoning (although they are oen based partly on it).4
at intuitions cannot be based solely on conscious reasoning should not
be surprising. Philosophers ought to be interested in a source of evidence
that is not based on conscious reasoning, since conscious reasoning oen
(maybe even always) involves application of theory and we use intuitions to
criticize or support theories.e fact that they are not based solely on con-
scious reasoning makes intuitions seem like a non-question begging source
of evidence for and against theories.
is distinction is crucial to the investigation of intuitions. We should be
pursuing an understanding of how intuitions come about, what factors af-
fect them, and so forth. Intuitions do not come solely from consciousmental
processes, and conscious mental processes are the only ones we have intro-
spective access to; thus, we cannot gain this understanding wholly through
introspection. We also cannot gure out how intuitions come about through
a priori reasoning alone, since there are a great number of possible uncon-
scious mental processes that could generate seemings of the sort we are dis-
cussing. is is not to say that introspection and a priori reasoning are
wholly irrelevant to the study of intuitions, or that they cannot tell us any-
thing about them. We can rule out some theories of intuitions a priori (for
example, logically impossible ones, or ones that wouldmake intuitions infal-
lible) or on the basis of introspection (for example, those that would produce
conscious mental states that we do not experience). However, once we have
eliminated all the theories of how intuitions work that we can in this way,
we are still le with a number of contenders and must look to other meth-
ods. Since introspection and a priori reasoning are the traditional tools of
philosophy, we must look outside of philosophy for these methods. Given
that intuitions are at least partly mental phenomena, we should learn about
them via the rigorous, scientic study of themind; in other words, an under-
standing of intuitions should come from psychology (or cognitive science,
but I will use these terms interchangeably throughout this paper).
3. Understanding Intuitions without Psychology
Onemight try to avoid this conclusion by claiming that the type of intuitions
philosophers are interested in are a subset of the seemings I am calling “in-
tuitions”, and that we can know how this subset works without consulting
4 e discussion in this paragraph owes a lot to talks I have had with Brian Bowman and
Geo Georgi. It is also similar to an argument made in (Cohen 1986).
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psychology. For example, both George Bealer (1998) and Lawrence BonJour
(1998) give accounts of how intuitions are generated (of varying degrees of
completeness) that are not based on psychological research. However, any
account of the workings of philosophical intuitions that is entirely a priori
will run into a signicant problem: while we may be able to show a priori
that a certain type of mental event must be produced in a certain way, the
claim that the seemings philosophers experience and use as evidence are of
that type is an empirical claim.5
To illustrate, let us consider Bealer’s account of intuitions. Bealer’s the-
ory of the workings of our intuitive faculties starts from the claim that our
intuitions must be a good source of evidence. His argument for this is based
on the following premise: worries about the use of intuitions as evidence are
themselves based on intuitions. He goes on to argue that if intuitions are
unreliable, then these worries are ill-founded; if intuitions are reliable, then
“we have a wealth of concrete-case intuitions to the eect that intuitions are
prima facie evidence [. . . ] Because these intuitions about the evidential sta-
tus of intuitions would be reliable, it would follow that intuitions are in fact
prima facie evidence [. . . ]” (Bealer 1993, 107). In either case, the argument
goes, we need not be concerned about the evidential status of intuitions.
ere are a number of problems with this argument, but I will focus on
one only.6 Even if intuitions are generally reliable, this does not mean that
they are reliable in every circumstance or about every subject—for example,
intuitions about intuitions might be unreliable. Further, it does not mean
that intuitions about the evidential status of intuitions are correct. So Bealer
has not shown that intuitions are prima facie evidence. Nor has he shown
that, if intuitions are reliable, we even have evidence that intuitions are evi-
dence; this requires either that ‘X is reliably accurate’ entails ‘X is evidence’, or
that we have evidence that intuitions are reliable. Bealer’s argument about
the evidential status of intuitions requires that we know something about
how intuitions are produced and when they do and do not go wrong. It can-
not, then, be used as the basis for an account of how intuitions work.
BonJour’s account of intuitions runs into a similar problem. Like Bealer,
BonJour bases his account of how intuitions work on claims about epis-
temology. Specically, he argues that to avoid skepticism we must have a
source of a priori justication, and that the only one that will do is intuition;
5 is is not true across the board; if one consequence of a theory of how intuitions work
is that they are always accurate, for example, we can show that our intuitions are not pro-
duced in that way without consulting psychology. But for any viable theory of intuitions,
showing that it applies to our intuitions is still a largely empirical project.
6 See (Cummins 1998) especially footnote 8, for a response to the claim that worries about
intuitions are based on intuitions and self defeating.
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he then goes on to explain how intuitions could work in order to avoid skep-
ticism. Even granting BonJour’s claims about skepticism and a priori justi-
cation, he has not given a strong foundation for a general theory of the
sources of intuitions.e connection BonJour brings up between intuitions
and skepticism is that avoiding skepticism requires a priori justication in
employing certain reasoning methods. All that needs to be true about our
intuitions to avoid the skeptical problems BonJour raises is that some intu-
itions about certain reasoning methods give us justication for using these
methods.7ere are a number of ways that intuitions could be generated so
that they would justify use of these reasoning methods, but unfortunately
many of these dier in howmuch justication we would get from intuitions
they generate on other topics. One can fairly easily conceive of ways of gen-
erating intuitions that give us justied beliefs about reasoning methods but
vary widely with regards to, for example, the justicatory status of the moral
or metaphysical intuitions they produce.8 So even if BonJour is right about
the connection between intuitions and skepticism, the question of how we
generate our intuitions remains open and interesting, and the answer will be
contingent and a posteriori.
What lesson does this illustrate? Developing a priori a theory of the
sources of the intuitions that philosophers experience and use as evidence is
not going to produce a very useful theory. Too much about these seemings
is, due to their nature, hidden and not amenable to philosophical scrutiny.
Because of this, there are a great number of importantly dierent theories
that t what we know a priori (or due to introspection) about philosophical
intuitions. In order to determine how intuitions work, we need more facts,
facts that will come from psychology.
One nal point: philosophers should not be only interested in psycho-
logical studies of the intuitions we use in philosophy (intuitions about philo-
sophical topics like good and bad, knowledge and justication, substance
and mind, and so forth). We should be very interested in studies of ordi-
nary, every-day intuitions—intuitions about the categorization of animals
and household objects, or the possibility of ordinary events occurring, or
intuitions about the ordinary behavior of other human beings. To see why
this is, consider one source of serious worry about intuitions in philosophy:
that we do not know the extent to which they are reliable. Robert Cummins
argues that if we could address concerns about the reliability of intuitions in
7 See (BonJour 1998, chapter 1).
8 For a very crude example, compare the following two sources of intuitions: the rst is
whatever source you like that gives one justied beliefs about any philosophical issue.e
second is that same source except with a “mental block” when (and only when) it comes
to producing intuitions about ethical questions.
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philosophy, then we would not actually need to use intuitions as evidence
(Cummins 1998). His argument is that in order to know whether or not in-
tuitions are reliable sources of data we need to determine the extent to which
(and the conditions in which) they get us the correct answers to questions.
However, if we can do this, then wemust have a source of correct answers to
philosophical questions that is not based on intuitions, and thus we do not
need intuitions. So, he argues, either we cannot know intuitions are reliable
(and thus should not use them) or we do not need to use intuitions. Cum-
mins has, however, overlooked one way of checking the reliability of our
intuitions. We can determine how intuitions work—the data they are likely
to be sensitive to and the data they are likely to ignore, andwhat factorsmake
themmore or less accurate—by studying intuitions about non-philosophical
questions we know the correct answers to. ese are questions about ordi-
nary objects, behavior, possibilities, and so forth. We can compare what
we learn about how intuitions do and do not work for ordinary questions
with our demands on a source of evidence for philosophical questions, and
calibrate our intuitions in this way. But this means that we need to inform
ourselves about the workings of intuitions about somewhat prosaic topics.9
One might wonder about how an understanding of intuitions based in
psychology would intersect with dierent types of philosophical projects. Is
it really of relevance to every type of philosophical inquiry? Are there do-
mains about which we can determine, without psychology, that intuitions
just cannot tell us anything interesting, or those about which we can put
concerns to the side without looking to psychology? In the next three sec-
tions, I will consider these questions by discussing conceptual analysis, the
study of extra-conceptual facts (facts about things other than concepts), and
experimental philosophy.
9 One worry about this claim comes from the theory that the mind is modular—that judg-
ments on specic topics are generated by parts of the mind devoted to that topic along—
and that learning about how intuitions about a given topic are generated would give us
limited or no insight into how intuitions about dierent topics come about.is is only a
worry if dierences in how judgments on dierent topics are generated are largely innate—
if the processes used by mental modules to generate judgments are almost entirely the
product of genetics. It could be, though, that mental modules are the result of one, or a
few, general learning processes that build them over our lifetimes. If so, we could learn
how various modules work by learning how the general module-building process works.
A large number of theorists who take the mind as modular do not accept that these mod-
ules are innate, and I think the evidence for innateness is quite weak, but this debate is
outside the scope of this paper (for more, see Carruthers 2006).
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4. DoWe Need Psychology to Do Conceptual Analysis?
One view of the role of intuitions in philosophy is that they help us to do
conceptual analysis. By examining one’s intuitions about X one gains a bet-
ter understanding of one’s concept of X. Conceptual analysis is an important
step on the road to learning about X, since it is dicult to answer ques-
tions about something when one does not know what it is the questions are
about. For example, if I want to answer the question ‘Do I have free will?’
it is very important for me to know what my concept of free will involves,
which requires me to do conceptual analysis, which requires that I use my
intuitions. is is a relatively modest view of the role of intuitions (to bor-
row a phrase from Jackson 1998); according to it, intuitions need not reect
anything about the world outside of our heads. Conceptual analysis is gen-
erally seen as a prototypical armchair project, one for which the traditional
tools of philosophy are sucient (see, e.g., Fumerton 1999). Given this, we
would expectmany conceptual analysts to take psychological ndings on in-
tuitions to be irrelevant to their project.ey should not, however, because
intuitions about a subject matter do not always reect one’s concept of that
subject matter, and when they do reect one’s concepts, they oen do so in
a less than straightforward way. Determining the relationship between our
intuitions and our concepts requires that we understand how intuitions are
produced.10
Let us look at some examples. In the right conditions, an intuition with
some content can be caused simply by recently hearing or seeing a sentence
with the same or related propositional content, even if the intuitor was given
no evidence that that sentence is true, and sometimes even if they were told
that the sentence is false (Gilbert 1991, Gilbert et al. 1990, 1993, Begg et al.
1992). An intuitor thus might have the intuition that “one cannot try to do
something without intending to do it”, due not to that intuitor’s concepts of
trying or intending, but rather due to having heard that statement recently
made.11 Intuitors can also interpret thought experiments in surprising ways
without knowing that they are doing so.is can cause a philosopher to form
an erroneous view of the concept the thought experiment is supposed to give
information about. For example, people have what is called a hindsight bias.
is bias causes them, once they know the outcome of an action or event, to
believe that the outcome was more or less inevitable, and that prior to the
outcome people could have known or did know that the outcome was in-
evitable (Schwartz and Vaughn 2002).is is likely to aect intuitions about
10is argument is developed more in my paper “e End of the Armchair for Conceptual
Analysis?” (manuscript).
11 is example was picked more or less at random, and I mean to cast no aspersions on any
who actually have that intuition.
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moral luck. Inmany thought experiments about moral luck, two agents per-
form the same action, but the results of their actions are dierent. Intuitively,
they are dierently praise- or blameworthy.is is supposed to show us that
our concepts of praiseworthiness and blameworthiness are such that a per-
son can be properly praised or blamed for things outside their control. How-
ever, hindsight bias may cause intuitors to unconsciously “believe” that the
agents in the thought experiment knew (or should have known) how their
acts would turn out.us, the dierential praise or blamemay be due to see-
ing the agents as acting dierently, one with the foreknowledge that things
will turn out well, the other with the foreknowledge that things will turn out
ill. is does not generate a moral luck problem. We can discover whether
or not this bias aects our intuitions, and potentially control for it when it
does, through rigorous study; however, this possibility is not one that we
would be aware of without an understanding of psychology.is shows that
conceptual analysis via intuitions is not always straightforward and it may
be quite easy to go wrong without an understanding of our psychology.
Psychology can not only aect the way we interpret our intuitions, but
also the shape of analyses of concepts based on intuitions.12 Since at least
Wittgenstein, philosophers have been aware of how dicult it is to analyze
concepts into sets of a certain kind of necessary and sucient conditions.
Further, psychologists have produced evidence that, if our intuitions are an
important guide to the shapes of our concepts, then formany concepts no list
of necessary and sucient conditions of the kind philosophers are interested
in can be given.13 However, there is also psychological research that sug-
gests that some types of concepts are more likely than others to be amenable
to analysis into philosophically interesting necessary and sucient condi-
tions; these are what are called “basic level” concepts, which are less likely to
be Wittgensteinian family resemblance categories than so-called “superor-
dinate” concepts (for more on basic level categories, see Mervis and Rosch
1981, Rosch and Mervis 1975, Murphy 2002). If it turns out that basic level
concepts are more oen analyzable into necessary and sucient conditions
using intuitions than non-basic level concepts, then themethods used to an-
alyze a given concept, and the sorts of results we expect to produce, should
vary based on whether or not the concept in question is basic level; identi-
12 I am not by any means the rst to notice this. See, for example, (Ramsey 1998).
13 e most famous discussion of this topic is from (Rosch andMervis 1975), but controversy
about their results and what they mean is ongoing. It may be, for example, that concepts
are better captured by looking at a combination of intuitive and reective use of words, so
that we can give necessary and sucient conditions for application of a concept as long as
we look to data from non-intuitive use of the concept. Further, this is also not to say that
no list of necessary and sucient conditions can capture these concepts, but rather that
these lists will look quite dierent than those philosophers are typically interested in.
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fying concepts as basic level requires an understanding of psychology.
My goal here is not to list every way in which psychological research
bears on the use of intuitions for conceptual analysis, but rather to show
that it can and does in some ways, in order to show that it is important for
us to start guring out what those ways are. We can see, then, that even if
one’s interest in intuitions is due only to an interest in conceptual analysis,
one ought to pay attention to psychological research.
5. Intuition and “ingsemselves”
We have just seen some ways that an understanding of psychology is impor-
tant to the use of intuitions for conceptual analysis. Many of us, however,
are interested in more than simply what our concepts of things like respon-
sibility or intention or causation are—we want to know what responsibility,
intention, or causation themselves actually are.14 Some philosophers, such as
Hilary Kornblith or Frank Jackson, interested in “things themselves” rather
than our concepts of them, have argued that intuitions should play at most a
very limited role in philosophy (e.g. Kornblith 2006 or Jackson 1998).ey
argue that we might look to intuitions to understand very generally what
the subject of some domain of philosophy (such as epistemology or meta-
physics) is, or how we ought to talk about it, but once we have done that
intuitions are no longer useful because they do not tell us facts about things
themselves.
is conclusion is not always warranted. Psychology shows us that intu-
itions can tell us about more than just the content of our concepts, and that
they can tell us things we would be hard pressed to discover without them.
However, intuitionswill not necessarily be useful evidence about every ques-
tion in philosophy. Philosophers interested in facts about “things them-
selves” should thus be interested in a psychologically-based understanding
of how our intuitions are generated and what information they are based on.
Intuitions can potentially be an extremely helpful tool, and to understand
when and how to use this tool we need to understand their source.
To see this, let us consider some facts about the capabilities of our uncon-
scious minds, since intuitions are generated in part by unconscious mental
processes. e unconscious is superior to the conscious mind at process-
14 Hilary Kornblith, for example, says
My own view is that our concepts of knowledge and justication are of no
epistemological interest. e proper objects of epistemological theorizing
are knowledge and justication themselves, rather than our concepts of
them. (Kornblith 2006, 11–12).
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ing information in some ways. In fact, when we use conscious faculties to
make judgments that are usually made unconsciously, the results are oen
inferior to what the unconscious mind would have produced (e.g., Wilson
and Schooler 1991). Our unconscious minds can track relationships that oc-
cur over longer periods of time, or are more complex, than our conscious
minds can trackwithoutmechanical assistance (Lewicki et al. 1992). Our un-
conscious is also sensitive to information that our conscious minds will not
normally notice. Our unconscious detects, processes, andmakes judgments
based on information that we consciously consider irrelevant (e.g., Lewicki
et al. 1989, Betsch et al. 2001).is is important because this information can
actually be relevant to judgments without our knowing it. Our unconscious
can use information for which we have no words, whereas this can be quite
dicult for our conscious minds.15 e unconscious is less sensitive to dis-
traction and to other mental demands than is the conscious mind—it keeps
noticing and processing information even when the conscious mind is over-
whelmed (e.g. Betsch et al. 2001, Dijksterhuis 2004, Gilbert and Krull 1988).
Some specic examples of judgments that the unconscious excels at mak-
ing are social judgments and judgments about our own mental states: we
are able to ascertain the feelings of others, predict their behavior, and judge
when they are honest without knowing how we do so (Ambady and Rosen-
thal 1992), and our unconscious has access to information about certain of
our own beliefs, desires, motivations, and opinions that our conscious mind
has no direct access to (Wilson 2002).
What does all this tell us? It tells us that many of our intuitions will be
based on information we would not consider using, or be able to use, con-
sciously.is information can be the sort of informationwe ought to be pay-
ing attention to if we wish to make accurate judgments about philosophical
topics. To see this, consider three related philosophical subjects: responsi-
bility, intention, and causation. Attributions of responsibility, or intention-
ality, or causality, should be sensitive to subtle distinctions between people,
or mental states, or physical relationships. Both causation and responsibility
come in degrees, and the amount of each which should be attributed most
likely depends on a multitude of small and easily overlooked factors present
in dierent situations. e ability to make accurate judgments about these
three should require the ability to put together vast amounts of minute de-
tails and notice patterns that occur over long periods of time.ese are ex-
actly the sorts of things our unconsciousmind is capable of doing better than
our conscious mind.us, we have reason to think that in some cases intu-
itions about responsibility, intention, or causation will be based on real and
important distinctions that we would be likely to overlook using only our
15 See for example (Murphy 2002), or research on infants such as (Campos et al. 1978).
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conscious faculties. Parallel arguments can plausibly be made for numerous
topics in metaphysics, ethics, epistemology, the philosophy of action, and
the philosophy of mind.
is argument is of necessity something of a promissory note. My point
is not that our intuitions will always give us useful information about things
themselves, a claim that would be hard to assert given the obvious fact that
intuitions are not always accurate. My point is that we have reason to ex-
pect that they can in some cases give us such information, and that this in-
formation may be dicult to obtain otherwise. A developed, empirically-
informed understanding of our intuitive faculties of the sort I have been
arguing for in this paper is needed to determine which cases these are, and
to allow us to best use intuitions when they can be helpful.
6. Experimental Philosophy
Experimental philosophy is the recentmovement to incorporate experimen-
tal rigor into the gathering of intuitions. Some experimental philosophers
believe that intuitions are a philosophically important source of evidence,
while others have employed experimental results to cast doubt on their use.
We should be hesitant to accept the results of philosophical experiments if
they are not supplemented by an understanding of the psychology behind
our intuitions.
To make this point more clearly, let us consider an example, one of the
most famous pieces of experimental philosophy: thework of JonathanWein-
berg, ShaunNichols, and Stephen Stich on epistemic intuitions (2001).ey
advance the following claims: intuitions about knowledge and justication
tend to vary from culture to culture, and this undermines our reasons for
using intuitions about knowledge and justication as evidence for epistemic
theories.ey argue that when intuitions about epistemology dier between
groups, we have no good reason to choose one set of intuitions as evidence
over the other. If we have no principled way to choose between the intu-
itions, and intuitions are supposed to be the basis for our theory, we have
no way to choose between a theory based on one set of intuitions or the
other. It is inappropriate to choose a philosophical theory arbitrarily, or
based on provincial considerations (e.g., we are more accustomed to one
theory), especially when that theory is normative, as are theories of justi-
cation or knowledge. us, dierences in intuitions about epistemology
between groups are problematic for those who wish to found their theories
on intuitions.
e evidence Weinberg, Nichols, and Stich give that there are cultural
variations in intuitions comes from experiments in which they presented
versions of various classical epistemological thought experiments (such as
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Gettier cases) to subjects from dierent cultural backgrounds, specically
East Asians andWesterners, and to subjects of dierent socio-economic sta-
tus. ey found statistically signicant variations in reactions to some of
these thought experiments. From this, they concluded that there are dif-
ferences in intuitions between the groups, and thus that basing theories of
knowledge or justication on intuitions is problematic.
One plausible objection to this conclusion comes fromErnest Sosa (2005).
Sosa makes the point that, “[g]iven that these subjects are suciently dif-
ferent culturally and socio-economically, they may because of this import
dierent assumptions [. . . ]” as they consider the situations given in these
thought experiments, with the result that they are not in actuality disagree-
ing (Sosa 2005, 107).is point, however, is speculative—these subjectsmay
be interpreting the thought experiments dierently, but we have no particu-
larly strong evidence that they are.is is where a psychologically informed
understanding of intuitions plays a vital role; the best way to assess Sosa’s ob-
jectionwould be to look for empirical evidence that there are or are not cross
cultural dierences in interpretations of these thought experiments. Con-
sideration of psychological ndings on cultural cognitive dierences gives
us just such evidence.
According to Weinberg, Nichols, and Stich, “Richard Nisbett and his
collaborators have shown that there are large and systematic dierences be-
tween East Asians andWesterners on a long list of basic cognitive processes
including perception, attention and memory” (Weinberg et al. 2001). e
existence of dierences in cognitive processes between the groupsWeinberg,
Nichols, and Stich tested makes less speculative the claim that such dier-
ences may have caused dierences in interpretation of the thought experi-
ments used. It also opens up another possible objection to their argument:
the processes that generate one culture’s intuitionsmay be systematically bet-
ter at generating the intuitions in question, or one group may be prone to a
bias that makes their intuitions less relevant to epistemology, and this would
give us a means of resolving the conict. Although I do not have the space
to do an exhaustive review of Weinberg, Nichols, and Stich’s results given
ndings on cultural cognitive dierences, by considering some examples I
can show that it plausible that the discovered intuitive dierences are due to
cultural cognitive dierences, and thus show that their research (and experi-
mental philosophymore generally) would benet from further examination
of the psychology behind our intuitions.
According to the researchers cited byWeinberg, Nichols, and Stich, East
Asians are supposed to be more subject to hindsight bias than Americans,
whereas American subjects are more likely than East Asians to make what
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is called the “fundamental attribution error” (Norenzayan et al. 2002).16 As
discussed above, hindsight bias is the tendency, once one knows how some-
thing turns out, to think that that outcome was more or less inevitable and
predictable from the outset. e fundamental attribution error is the ten-
dency to “make inferences about the dispositions of others even when sit-
uational forces explain the behavior quite nicely” (Gilbert 2002, 169). For
example, in one study, “students who are randomly assigned to receive bad
news may, on average, be judged as more chronically depressed than stu-
dents who are randomly assigned to receive good news” (Gilbert 2002, 169).
ese dierences could explain dierential reactions to thought experiments
such as Gettier cases.
What is typical of a Gettier case is that a person is described who uses
a belief forming method (such as deductive reasoning) which normally is
a good one to use; they end up forming a true belief, but because of de-
tails about their situation, this is due largely to luck. Westerners were more
likely than Asians to say that person described in Gettier cases only believed
something, rather than knew it. Note that in Gettier cases there is a fact—
believing something true due to luck—which is perfectly well explained by a
quirk of the situation the believer nds themselves in. A person prone to the
fundamental attribution error, and thus likely to make character judgments
based on single events, might explain this fact however as due to the char-
acter of the believer and think that the person described normally relies on
luck in their reasoning. Howmight this aect their intuitions? It is plausible
that the ways in which one typically reasons and forms beliefs makes a dif-
ference as to whether or not one knows any given proposition they believe;
this is the core of virtue epistemology. If we are tacit virtue epistemologists,
then seeing someone as a person who normally relies on luck to form their
beliefs would give us reason to think that a specic belief they formed in this
way would not count as something they know. However, if we saw that per-
son as someone who did not normally rely on luck to form true beliefs, then
the fact that luck played a role in this case might not entail a lack of knowl-
edge (in this case). us, Westerners’ greater tendency to say that people
described in Gettier cases do not know what they believe makes more sense
given their greater tendency to commit the fundamental attribution error.
Likewise, cultural dierences in intuitions aboutGettier casesmight also
be due in part to hindsight bias.is bias makes people prone to think that
the way things actually turned out was inevitable and predictable from the
onset. In Gettier cases, one comes to form a true belief through luck; how-
16 Weinberg, Nichols, and Stich cite (Nisbett et al. 2001), whereas I am citing (Norenzayan
et al. 2002). However, the two papers share two co-authors, and both refer to similar bodies
of research.
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ever, if coming to this true belief was inevitable, or predictable, then it looks
less like the product of luck. If the role of luck is part of why the believer in
Gettier cases fails to know what they believe, as many philosophers claim,
then itmakes sense that people who see luck as less of a factor in the situation
described also tend to think that the believer in question really knows what
they believe. Asians’ greater tendency to experience hindsight bias might
partly explain why they have a greater tendency to intuit that people in Get-
tier cases really do know what they believe.
is is only the sketch of an argument, and more research—both philo-
sophical and empirical—is needed. It is unlikely that either factor by itself
explains all of the dierences in responses found byWeinberg, Nichols, and
Stich; cross-cultural dierences in the tendency to commit the fundamental
attribution error, for example, are not as large as the dierences in responses
detected.17 My goal, though, is not to refute Weinberg, Nichols, and Stich’s
arguments, but to illustrate the following point: the success of their argu-
ment turns on psychological facts, facts about how thought experiments are
interpreted, and about the presence or absence of mental biases that could
discount the normative intuitions of some groups.us, a full evaluation of
their arguments calls for an understanding of the psychology of intuitions.
We can extrapolate from this example to experimental philosophy in gen-
eral, since even when experimental philosophers do not study normative
phenomena, their arguments still require an understanding of how intuitors
generate their intuitions. Changes in the way we gather intuitions of the sort
advocated by experimental philosophers should go hand in hand with the
application of the sort of understanding of intuitions that I am advocating.
7. Conclusion
Philosophers have good reason to be concerned about the use of intuitions
in philosophy. To address these concerns, we should have an understand-
ing how our intuitive faculties work, what intuitions are based on, and what
might make them go awry. Because intuitions cannot be generated by con-
sciousmental processes, but can be generated by any number of unconscious
ones, we cannot gain such an understanding just by doing philosophy (that
is, purely a priori or through introspection). We need to look at what psy-
chologists have learned about intuitions. A psychologically informed theory
of intuitions is of relevance tomost philosophers, whether they are interested
in conceptual analysis or whether they are interested in “things themselves”.
17 A defense of Weinberg, Nichols, and Stich’s results along these lines actually bolsters my
claim about the importance to experimental philosophy of an understanding of how our
intuitions work, since such defenses are based themselves in an understanding of psychol-
ogy.
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is does not mean that psychology can replace philosophy, or that it will
answer philosophical questions by itself.eory building in the light of in-
tuitive evidence (or the lack thereof), and thinking about what questions to
ask and how to ask them, are philosophical, not psychological, tasks.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Steve Finlay, Janet Levin, Kadri Vihvelin, Julia Stael,
Brian Bowman, and Geo Georgi for their help with this paper.
Bibliography
Ambady, N. and Rosenthal, R. (1992). in slices of expressive behavior as
predictors of interpersonal consequences: A meta-analysis, Psychological
Bulletin 111: 256–274.
Bealer, G. (1993). e incoherence of empiricism, in S. J. Wagner and
R. Warner (eds), Naturalism: A critical appraisal, University of Indiana
Press, Notre Dame, pp. 163–196.
Bealer, G. (1998). Intuition and the autonomy of philosophy, in M. DePaul
and W. Ramsey (eds), Rethinking intuition, Rowman & Littleeld, Lan-
ham, pp. 201–240.
Begg, I., Anas, A. and Farinacci, S. (1992). Dissociation of processes in be-
lief: Source recollection, statement familiarity, and the illusion of truth,
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 121: 446–458.
Betsch, T., Plessner, H., Schwieren, C. and Gutig, R. (2001). I like it but i
don’t knowwhy: A value-account approach to implicit attitude formation,
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 27: 242–253.
BonJour, L. (1998). In defense of pure reason, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge.
Campos, J. J., Hiatt, S., Ramsay, D., Henderson, C. and Svejda, M. (1978).
e emergence of fear on the visual cli, in M. Kewis and L. Rosenblum
(eds),e development of aect, Plenum, New York, pp. 149–182.
Carruthers, P. (2006). e case for massively modular models of mind, in
R. Stainton (ed.), Contemporary debates in cognitive science, Blackwell,
Malden, pp. 3–21.
Cohen, L. (1986). e dialogue of reason, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Cummins, R. (1998). Reections on reective equilibrium, inM.DePaul and
W. Ramsey (eds), Rethinking intuition, Rowman & Littleeld, Lanham,
Brian Talbot 175
pp. 113–128.
Dijksterhuis, A. (2004).ink dierent: The merits of unconscious thought
in preference and decision making, Journal of Personality and Social Psy-
chology 87: 586–598.
Fumerton, R. (1999). A priori philosophy aer an a posteriori turn,Midwest
Studies in Philosophy 23: 21–33.
Gilbert, D. (1991). How mental systems believe, American Psychologist
46: 107–119.
Gilbert, D. (2002). Inferential correction, in T. Gilovich, D. Grin and
D.Kahneman (eds),Heuristics and biases: The psychology of intuitive judg-
ment, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 167–184.
Gilbert, D. and Krull, D. (1988). Seeing less and knowing more: The bene-
ts of perceptual ignorance, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
54: 193–202.
Gilbert, D., Krull, D. and Malone, P. (1990). Unbelieving the unbelievable:
Some problems in the rejection of false information, Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology 59: 601–613.
Gilbert, D., Tafarodi, R. and Malone, P. (1993). You can’t not believe every-
thing you read, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 65: 221–233.
Jackson, F. (1998). From metaphysics to ethics: A defense of conceptual anal-
ysis, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Kornblith, H. (2006). Appeals to intuition and the ambitions of episte-
mology, in S. Hetherington (ed.), Epistemology futures, Oxford University
Press, Oxford, pp. 10–25.
Lewicki, P., Hill, T. and Czyzewska, M. (1992). Nonconscious acquisition of
information, American Psychologist 47: 796–801.
Lewicki, P., Hill, T. and Sasaki, I. (1989). Self-perpetuating development of
encoding biases, Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 118: 323–337.
Mervis, C. and Rosch, E. (1981). Categorization of natural objects, Annual
Review of Psychology 32: 89–115.
Murphy, G. (2002). e big book of concepts, MIT Press, Cambridge.
Nisbett, R., Peng, K., Choi, I. and Norenzayan, A. (2001). Culture and sys-
tems of thought: Holistic versus analytic cognition, Psychological Review
108: 291–310.
Norenzayan, A., Smith, E., Kim, B. and Nisbett, R. (2002). Cultural prefer-
ences for formal versus intuitive reasoning,Cognitive Science 26: 653–684.
Pust, J. (2000). Intuitions as evidence, Routledge, New York.
176 Psychology and the Use of Intuitions in Philosophy
Ramsey, W. (1998). Prototypes and conceptual analysis, in M. DePaul and
W. Ramsey (eds), Rethinking intuition, Rowman & Littleeld, Lanham,
pp. 161–178.
Rosch, E. andMervis, C. (1975). Family resemblances: Studies in the internal
structure of categories, Cognitive Psychology 7: 573–605.
Schwartz, N. and Vaughn, L. (2002). e availability heuristic revisited:
Ease of recall and content of recall as distinct sources of information, in
T. Gilovich, D. Grin and D. Kahneman (eds),Heuristics and biases: The
psychology of intuitive judgment, CambridgeUniversity Press, Cambridge,
pp. 103–119.
Sosa, E. (1998). Minimal intuition, inM. DePaul and W. Ramsey (eds), Re-
thinking intuition, Rowman & Littleeld, Lanham, pp. 257–270.
Sosa, E. (2005). A defense of the use of intuitions in philosophy, in D. Mur-
phy and M. Bishop (eds), Stich and his critics, Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 101–
112.
Weinberg, J., Crowley, S., Gonnerman, C., Swain, S. and Vandewalker, I.
(2006). Intuition and calibration. manuscript.
Weinberg, J., Nichols, S. and Stich, S. (2001). Normativity and epistemic
intuitions, Philosophical Topics 29: 429–460.
Wilson, T. (2002). Strangers to ourselves: Discovering the adaptive uncon-
scious, Belknap Press, Cambridge.
Wilson, T. and Schooler, J. (1991). inking too much: Introspection can
reduce the quality of preferences and decisions, Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology 60: 181–192.
